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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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-v-
MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN, 
Case No. 16922 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty of Rape and 
Burglary in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16922 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, MELVIN JA..~S WQPJ(MAN, appeals from a con-
viction of Rape, a Second Degree Felony and Burglary, a Second 
Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN, was found guilty 
of Rape and Burglary by a jury. The trial was heard by the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin. Appellant was sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years for both offenses to run consecutively at the Utah State 
Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON" APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Deana English testified that on the 19th day of 
February, 1979, at approximately 1:00 a.m. a man entered her 
apartment at 3378 South Fifth East (TR 11,14,15). She was 
awakened when the man put his hand over her mouth, turned her over 
on her stomach, put a pillow over her head, and raped her. She 
further testified that he informed her that he had a gun and 
instructed her not to scream. (TR 18). A brown leather wallet 
was found by a police officer who investigated the case. (TR 27). 
The prosecutor introduced statements made by appellant which are 
tantamount to a confession. Through direct examination of 
Connie Riley, the following testimony was elicited by the pros-
ecutor: 
Q: Tell--use the words he used as best you can 
recall. What did [Melvin Workman] say? 
A: I am going to sit here and wait, the cops know--
have my wallet. There is nothing you can do, 
I raped the girl. There is no need for you to 
go looking for my wallet, the cops have it, I 
know I left it at her place. (TR 90). 
Defense counsel made continuous objections to this line 
of questioning and finally moved for a mistrial. The basis of 
-2-
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the motion was that the prosecution had knowingly and intentionally 
failed to disclose the defendant's incriminating statements made to 
Connie Riley in the face of a specific request for that evidence 
at the preli~inary hearing. 
At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel and Officer 
Virgil Johnson particiapted in the following colloquy: 
[Defense counsel] Q: What statements did Mr. 
Workman make? 
A: That he entered the apartment--
Q: Who did he make these to? 
A: To Connie Riley. He entered the apartment 
and took $80.00 cash out of a wallet that 
was located in the front room. And that 
he put the wallet underneath a t.v. pillow 
in the front room area. And prior to leaving, 
dropped his wallet, some way or another. 
(Preliminary hearing transcript 79) 
Officer Johnson failed to disclose the most incriminating aspect 
of the statement--that the appellant raped the woman in the apart-
ment. A search of the preliminary hearing transcript discloses 
that Deputy County Attorney J. Campbell never acted to correct 
this false testimony. 
Quite apart from the prosecutorial misconduct in-
volving the aforementioned false testimony, defense counsel asked 
the prosecutor on numerous occasions during the pre-tr.ial phase 
of the case whether he had shared with defense counsel all the 
information he had on the case. During the pre-trial and 
-3-
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trial stages of the case Deputy County Attorney Lynn Payne 
appeared on behalf of the State. Mr. Payne assured defense 
counsel on every such occassion that he had done so. (TR 137). 
Defense counsel made conscious and deliberate strategic 
decisions based on the information given to him by Officer 
Johnson at the preliminary hearing and the prosecutor during 
the pre-trial stage of the case. Specifically, the appellant 
waived his right to a jury trial at the urging of his counsel 
(TR 2-4 and TR 139); the appellant refused a plea negotiation 
upon the advise of counsel (reference TR 149); and the appellant 
presented no rebuttal to the surprise testimony of Connie Riley. 
(TR 148-149 and TR 177). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION'S INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE STATEMENTS ALL~GEDLY MADE BY 
APPELLANT DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL 
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), this 
Court observed that an ancillary purpose of the preliminary 
hearing is that it serves as a discovery device enabling the 
defendant to be informed of the nature of the State's case against 
him. In the case at bar, defense counsel availed himself of this 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opportunity and pursued discovery in his case by questioning police 
officers concerning any incriminating statements made by the 
defendant. Additionally, defense counsel relied on the verbal 
assurances of the Deputy County Attorney assigned to the case 
that he (defense counsel) had .all the information regarding the 
case. (TR 137). The combined effect of Officer Johnson's misrep-
resentation and Deputy County Attorney Jerry Campbell's silence 
followed by Deputy County Attorney Lynn Payne's continued sup-
pression of material evidence acted to deny the appellant a fair 
trial. 
The appellant's request at his preliminary hearing for 
the disclosure of evidence in the possession of the prosecution 
was founded on the State's obligation to provide him with a 
fundamentally fair trial. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
7 of the Utah Constitution mandate that defendants receive fair 
trials. A fair trial embraces the right to expect and demand 
truthful responses to questions put to police officers under oath 
concerning the existence of inculpatory statements made by the 
defendant. Since the seminal case of Br'ad)i v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), courts have repeatedly held that the prosection's 
suppression of material evidence violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
-5-
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In Brady v. Maryland, supra, the defendant was convicted ( 
first degree murder and sentenced to death. After the conviction, 
he learned of an extrajudicial confession made by his accomplice, wt 
was later tried and convicted of the same crime, wherein the 
latter admitted the actual homicide. In spite of a request 
by defense counsel to examine any statements made by the 
accomplice, the prosecution refused to disclose the excuplatory 
evidence. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third 
Circuit's determination that suppression of the evidence was 
error, and concluded that the withholding of the confession was 
prejudicial. The Brady court also held that suppression of 
material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. 
In the case at bar, where a specific request was made 
for the evidence, there can be no conclusion other than that the 
suppression of the evidence by both Officer Johnson and Deputy 
County Attorney Jerry Campbell was done in bad faith. In Moonev 
v. Hoolohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the undisclosed evidence showed 
that the conviction was obtained by the knowing use of perjured 
testimony. In Mooney _the United States Supreme Court made clear 
that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation 
of known false testimony was incompatible with "rudimentary 
demands of justice." This holding was reaffirmed in Pyle v. 
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). 
-6-
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Regardless of whether Mr. Campbell acted in good faith 
or bad faith, the conclusion that the appellant was denied 
fundamental fairness is compelling. In Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959), the court stated, "the same result obtains 
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows 
it to go uncorrected when it appears." 360 U.S. at 269. 
The fact that a different prosecutor failed to correct 
the false testimony from the one who tried the case does not alter 
the conclusion that the appellant was denied fundamental fairness. 
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), defense counsel 
discovered subs~quent to trial that the Government had pro~ised 
a key witness irrnnunity from prosecutor if he testified for the 
Government. During trial however, the informant flatly denied 
that any such agreement was made. Despite the Government's 
contention that a different prosecution promised immunity from 
the one who tried the case, the Supreme Court held that the 
suppression of material evidence, regardless of whether it was 
done in good or bad faith, required a new trial: 
Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was 
a result of negligence or design, it is 
the responsibility of the prosecutor. 
The prosecutor's office is an entity 
and as such it is the spokesman for the 
government. Id. at 154. 
The expansion of criminal discovery to facillitate a 
fundamentally fair trial for the defendant is embodied in the 
-7-
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, notably Rule 16, In United 
States v. Pas~tial, 606 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1979), a magistrate 
entered a standing discovery order which directed the Government 
to perm.it the defendant to inspect documents, objects, photographs, 
etc., which would be material to the defense or intended for use 
by the Government in their case-in-chief. 'Although defense counsel 
was permitted to examine the prosecution's file, he never saw a 
letter from the defendant to an unindicted co-conspirator which 
exposed the defendant's plan to manufacture and distribute 
methaqualone. The Government asserted that the letter was in the 
file, and the failure of the defense to review it was the result 
of its own negligence. In spite of the Government's contention 
that the letter was in the file, the court ruled that the docu-
ment should have been produced under Rule 16 (a)(l)(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
The prosecution knew it had the letter and 
also knew that as to Pascual it amounted 
virtually to a signed plea of guilty ... 
Under the order to produce, it should have 
made certain that the letter was made 
available to the defendants in such a manner 
as would have eliminated any plausible 
dispute about it. 
606 F.2d at 565. 
Similarly, in the case at bar the prosecutor at the preliminary 
hearing knew that Officer Johnson was concealing the most damaging 
statement they attributed to the defendant from him and counsel 
in the face of a specific request for the disclosure of the evidence. 
-8-
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Although Pascual is distinguishable from the instant matter be-
cause there a magistrate entered a standing discovery order, the 
instant matter is nonetheless analagous where the committing 
magistrate ordered Officer Johnson to answer defense counsel's 
inquiries about any statemnts made by the appellant. 
In Pascual, the court noted that failure to comply with 
Rule 16(a) was not reversible without a showing of some prejudice. 
However, the court pointed out that the prejudice was abundantly 
manifest: 
It would be hard to make an argument with 
any degree of plausibility that the use of 
this letter without prior production did 
not seriously prejudice the defendants 
in exercising their option to plead not 
guilty and in their preparation for trial. 
In short, it was a written plea of guilty 
to the allegations contained in the 
indictment. 
606 F.2d at 565-566. 
Certainly the prejudice is just as c~early present in the case at 
bar. 
It is interesting to ·note that the Fifth Circuit pointed 
out that reversal in Pascual was necessary in order to enforce 
Rule 16: 
A new trial with this nail in the coffin lid, 
now fully disclosed, may likely result in 
another verdict of guilty. Nevertheless, 
the vindiction of Rule 16 and notice to 
Plaintiff's in this Circuit that they must 
effectively comply with it, leaves no choice 
but to reverse these convictions and remand 
-9-
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for a new trial. 
606 F.2d at 566. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, reversal is mandated to insure 
that the prosecution is not permitted to profit from its own 
wrongdoing. 
In State v. Hiteshaw, 476 P.2d 935 (Ore. 1970), the 
Oregon court refused to countenance the type of prosecutorial, 
misconduct which inheres in the case at bar. In Hiteshaw, 
the court ruled that the defendant was entitled to a new trial 
where the prosecutor, in defiance of a court order, failed to 
disclose a police report which included a statement attributed 
to the defendant: 
It seems evident that the prosecution sought 
to conceal the most damaging admission they 
attributed to defendant from him and counsel 
prior to trial, ih_defiance of the court's 
order. These tactics were unfair. 
560 P.2d t 936. 
The ratio decidendi of the Hiteshaw court applies with 
the same compelling logic in the case at bar. Moreover, the 
intentional suppression of the appellant's statements by the 
prosecution is all the more egregious in light of the guidelines 
set by the American Bar Association's project on standards for 
criminal justice. Section 2.1 of Standards Relating to Discovery 
and Procedure Before Trial sets out the prosecutor's obligations 
with respect to what must be disclosed to an accused: 
-10-
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... [T]he prosecuting attorney shall disclose 
to defense counsel the following material 
and information within his possession or 
control: 
... [ii] any written or recorded statements 
and the substance of an oral statements made 
byte accuse ... Empasis upp ie 
The commiit!tee c;iescribed the reasons it used in setting 
this standard in the accompanying commentary. With respect to 
Section 2.1 the committee stated: 
The basis for providing an accused a copy of 
his own statements has usually been the notion 
of fundamental fairn·ess, coupled with the 
absence of any compelling reason to withhold 
disclosure, at least in the cale of a statement 
during the prosecution's case. 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
The statements of an 1.accused obviously are of quint-
essential importance to defense counsel in :the preparation of 
his case. However, in State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 
(1977), the court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded 
the case for an evidentiary hearing where the failure to disclose 01 
concerned the statement of a potential alibi witness requested for 
the first time by defense counsel during the trial. In Brown, 
the defendant's attorney learned during trial that a sheriff's 
1. Also see the A.B.A Code of Professional Responsibility 
Ethical Consideration 7-13: "The responsibility of a public pros-
ecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to 
seek justice not merely to convict." 
-11-
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deputy had taken a statement from a potential alibi witness. 
Notwithstanding the inconvenient timing of the defense attorney's 
request for disclosure and the failure of the defense attorney 
to pursue fo·r.mal discover, the Idaho Supreme court ruled that the 
trial judge erred by not granting the defense's request and 
ordering disclosure. Because defense attorney had specifically 
requested the information, the Idaho court pointed out that a 
stricter rule was triggered as to the prosecution's duty to 
disclose. Quoting from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 
(1963), the Brown court stated: 
Although there is, of course, no duty to provide 
defense counsel with unlimited discovery of 
everything known by the prosecutor, if the sub-
ject matter of such a request is material, or 
indeed if a substantial basis for claiming 
materiality exists, it is reasonable to require 
the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing 
the information or by submitting the problem to 
the trial judge. When the prosecutor receives 
a specific and relevant request, the failure 
to make any response is seldom, if ever, 
excusable. 
427 U.S. at 106. 
560 P.2d at 883-884. 
Applying Brown to the instant matter, defense counsel 
requested disclosure of material evidence at the preliminary 
hearing - the defendant's statements. The State's failure to 
disclose these statements should not be excused. As the United 
States Supreme Court observed in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 
269 (1959), a conviction must fall "when the State, although not 
-12-
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soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears." 
The Utah Supreme Court has commented that a conviction 
obtained after the prosecution's suppression of evidence material 
to guilt or innocence is incompatible with the interests of 
justice. In State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975), the 
defendant contented that the errasure of. a tape which recorded a 
conversation between the defendant and an informant during a 
drug buy amounted to a suppression of evidence. The court disagreed 
but did point out that: 
[A] deliberate suppression or destruction of 
evidence by those charged with the prosecution, 
including police officers, constitutes a denial 
of due process if the evidence is materal to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a 
criminal case ... Id at 479. 
Clearly the suppression of evidence in the instant case was 
both deliberate and material to the defendant's guilt. 
In Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 824 (Utah 1979), the 
Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, alleging that evidence was withheld by the 
prosecution which would have been favorable to the defense. 
Defense counsel, upon learning that exclupatory evidence did exist, 
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the defendant's behalf, and 
was shortly thereafter handed copies of depositions which would 
-13-
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have assisted in the preparation and presentation of the defense. 
On the basis of this evidence, and due to the gravity of the 
matter, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a 
hearing to determine whether the disclosure of the evidence 
would have produced a different result. The court continued: 
It is fundamental that the State, in vigorously 
enforcing the laws, has a duty not only to 
secure appropriate convictions but perh?PS 
an even higher duty to see that justice is 
done, even if that means disclosing to defense 
counsel in a criminal case evidence which is 
exculpatory. Id. at 3. 
Most recently in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court examined in depth the defendant's 
contention that the prosecution illegally suppressed certain 
evidence. The defendant was convicted of attempted criminal 
homicide, and claimed that two police reports withheld by the 
prosecution would have tended to discredit the victim's ability 
to accurately perceive the critical events of the attack, they 
were also inconsistent with the reporting officer's testimony. 
It was conceded by the appellant that there was no effort made 
prior to trial to obtain copies of the reports. The factor which 
the court relied upon most heavily in rejecting the appellant's 
contention was that at trial, the appellant had not requested any 
of the reports. The reasons for this ruling were that it would 
place too great of a burden on the prosecution to anticipate what 
evidence wouldbeuseful to defense counsel, and secondly, defense 
-14-
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counsel would be able to go to trial, lose, then demand a new 
trial based on the prosecutor's failure to divulge exculpatory 
evidence. 
In the case at bar, defense counsel specifically 
requested the disclosure of the statement which Officer Johnson 
failed to reveal. Consequently, the appellant's claim does not 
suffer from the flaw which inhered in Jarrell. 
United State v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), sets out the 
standard to be applied in assessing the appellant's claim of error. 
The proper test to be applied in cases where a specific request is mad, 
is whether or not the failure to disclose has denied the def end-
ant " ... evidence [which] might have affected the outcome of the 
trial." 427 U.S. at 104. In the instant case, the fact that the 
statement amounted to a full confession made it sufficiently 
material to "have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. The 
failure of the prosecution to disclose the statement when 
specifically requested frustrates the interests of justice. 
Brady v. Maryland, supra, and its progeny have sought to 
insure that the accused avoids an unfair trial: "Society wins 
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials 
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers 
when any accused is treated unfairly." Id. at 87. 
In the instant matter the appellant has been treated 
unfairly. Relying on the veracity of Officer Johnson's sworn 
-15-
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testimony, Mr. Van Seiver advised his client to waive his right to 
trial by jury. Because Mr. Van Seiver was surprised at trial 
by the confession, he was completely unprepared to discredit 
the witness or rebut her testimony. Clearly Mr. Van Sciver's 
trial strategy would have been significantly· different had he 
been privileged to the most damaging admission attributed to 
the appellant, but intentionally concealed by the prosecution. 
For the reasons stated, the appellant respectfully 
asks this court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new 
trial. 
DATED this 2:3_ day of December, 1980. 
Res?ecfuf ully suBbmitted, 
1 
l I ~ L--· \ . lu (t ffJ) q_ \ ~~, S&l-t 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR 
Attorney for Appella·t~ant 
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